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INTRODUCTION 
Future climate projections for Southern Africa indicate an 
increase in drought frequency, intensity and severity, due to 
reduced precipitation and increased temperatures (Dai, 2013; 
Engelbrecht et al., 2015),  which is expected to be exacerbated 
by growing anthropogenic pressures on water use. Most of 
the severe droughts in the region, for example in 1982/1983, 
1991/1992 and 2015/2016, were El-Niño induced and have 
become a recurrent characteristic of the Southern African 
climate (Archer et al., 2017; Masih et al., 2014). The 2015/2016 
drought event is on record as the worst El-Niño induced 
drought in the region in the past 35 years. It impacted heavily 
on rainfed and irrigated agriculture, water resources and 
the environment (Baudoin et al., 2017), which resulted in a 
cereal deficit of about 7.8 million tons in the 2015/2016 season, 
compared to the previous year, leaving 9% of the population 
(about 27 million people) food insecure in the Southern 
African region (SADC, 2016). The response to the 2015/2016 
and preceding droughts in Southern Africa has been mainly 
reactive, with obvious measures such as providing food and 
water aid to affected people (Vogel et al., 2010). These reactive 
measures do not tackle the root cause of vulnerability of the 
water users (Baudoin et al., 2017; De Stefano et al., 2015),  
neither do they contribute to reducing the risk of future 
drought events or add value to strategic drought planning 
and management. As a result, most countries continue to 
experience severe impacts due to drought. However, there is a 
potential for using drought experiences as an evaluation tool 
and input to strategic planning, which could help to improve 
drought policy, use of decision support tools and drought 
management practices in the future.
The call for countries to move from reactive drought 
responses to more proactive responses (Baudoin et al., 
2017; Wilhite, 2011) has remained largely unanswered by 
governments, due to ineffective implementation of drought 
policies, a function of ‘government priorities’ other than 
the needs of the communities (Pradhan et al., 2017), lack 
of participation of local level authorities in the drought 
management planning and decision making process and the 
absence of collaborative institutional structures at national 
level (Vogel et al., 2010). Many researchers advocate for 
decentralized institutional arrangements that will not only deal 
with drought impacts but address the fundamental causes of 
vulnerability among water users and farmers (Agrawal, 2008; 
Baudoin et al., 2017). In addition, Andreu et al. (2009) indicate 
that drought management plans are often not effective in 
meeting water demands during drought because most countries 
rely on infrastructural solutions rather than systematic policies 
that include improved early warning systems and drought 
monitoring. According to Buchanan-Smith (2000), an effective 
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early warning system is that which will intervene before the 
drought event to prevent major or severe impacts. Furthermore, 
the effectiveness and accuracy of early warning systems, 
together with the way in which the information is translated 
and delivered by the meteorologists to the users, continue to be 
a prime concern of end users and decision makers (Seibert et 
al., 2017; Siderius et al., 2018; Sunday et al., 2013). 
Water resources planners argue that drought preparedness 
and management in semi-arid and arid areas should target 
water resources planning with great emphasis on drought 
mitigation (Andreu et al., 2009). This approach is thought to be 
a key step towards proactive responses to droughts, particularly 
by including drought preparedness plans as part of river basin 
management planning (Rossi and Castiglione, 2011). Moreover, 
developing drought preparedness plans and national drought 
policies seems an important step towards reducing the impact 
and risk of drought (Estrela and Vargas, 2012; Garrote et al., 
2007; Wilhite, 2011). However, drought preparedness plans 
and policies are not an end in themselves for water planners. 
There is a need for an enabling institutional environment 
across different scales (e.g. from local level to government 
level), as well as political will among all actors to effectively 
implement the plans and policies to attain their objective of 
reducing vulnerability and risk to drought for people and the 
environment. (Wang et al., 2015). 
Most studies on drought management in Southern Africa 
focus their analysis at the regional and national scale (e.g. 
Baudoin et al., 2017; Siderius et al., 2018; Vogel et al., 2010; 
Wilhite, 2000). This research analyses the local or community 
level where drought management plans and policies are 
implemented or practised within a particular institutional 
arrangement. Improved scientific knowledge and tools for 
drought management are often lacking in developing countries 
and, consequently, inadequate policies and adaptation 
strategies can be the outcome. The aim of this study is to 
analyse the responses to the 2015/2016 drought event in the 
Komati catchment in Southern Africa, and how the knowledge 
and experience gained by different actors could be utilized to 
improve future drought management. The study analyses the 
existing strengths and gaps in scientific tools used for drought 
management and policy formulation in the Komati catchment, 
aiming to contribute to better decision and policy making for 
drought-resilient water resources management. Thus, this study 
contributes to the body of knowledge on drought management 
and evaluates the performance of drought policies, plans, 
decision support tools and practices for drought management. 
METHODOLOGY
Study area
The study was carried out in the Komati catchment, which is 
one of the six catchments in the Incomati basin in Southern 
Africa. Whereas the Incomati basin is shared by three countries: 
Eswatini (formerly Swaziland), South Africa and Mozambique, 
the Komati catchment is shared between Eswatini and South 
Africa. The catchment is characterized by a semi-arid climate 
with a mean annual rainfall of 800 mm/year, which is highly 
variable in space and time (Van der Zaag and Vaz, 2003). The 
main land and water use in the catchment is agriculture, which is 
mostly dominated by perennial crops (sugarcane and fruit trees) 
and forest plantations (Nkomo and Van der Zaag, 2004). 
The catchment has a mean annual runoff of 1 430 Mm3/
year (JIBS, 2001). There are five significant dams in the Komati 
catchment constructed to deal with the increasing water 
demand for commercial agriculture in the region (Fig. 1,  
Table 1). The Nooitgedacht and Vygeboom Dams are located in 
the upper part of the Komati catchment (in the South African 
part), the Maguga Dam (Eswatini) and Driekoppies Dam 
(South Africa) in the lower part of the catchment, and the 
Sand River Dam is supplied through a canal from the Lower 
Komati River in Eswatini. This study focuses on the lower part 
of the catchment, downstream of Maguga and Driekoppies 
Dams. These two dams are managed by the Komati Basin 
Figure 1. The Komati catchment 
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Water Authority (KOBWA), a bi-national organization that 
was established in 1993 as a result of the Development and 
Utilization of Water Resources of the Komati River Basin treaty. 
Table 2 indicates the main institutions involved in the planning 
and management of the Lower Komati. 
Institutional arrangement in the management of 
drought in the catchment 
The operation and management of the water resources in the 
Komati catchment is governed by policies, rules and regulations 
of the two countries (Eswatini and South Africa). The countries 
have different economic capacities, which suggests differences 
in the vulnerabilities of the two societies to drought. Although 
there is no written drought policy for the Komati catchment nor 
for the entire Incomati basin, the Komati Basin Water Authority 
(KOBWA) plays a major role in drought management through 
water management for Maguga and Driekoppies Dams on 
behalf of Eswatini and South Africa. KOBWA operates under 
rules developed by the Incomati System Operating Task Group 
(ISOTG), which is an institution comprising of representatives 
from Eswatini, South Africa and Mozambique. The rules gave 
competence to KOBWA to develop decision support tools, 
including water allocation and rationing models, used for the 
conjunctive operation of the Maguga and Driekoppies Dams. 
Other important institutions which contribute to drought 
management in the catchment are shown in Fig. 2 (see the 
Appendix for detailed roles of the institutions). These include 
Komati Joint Operation Forum (KJOF) and irrigation boards. 
The disaster management agencies (DMAs) in both countries 
Figure 2. Schematic of the links between the institutions contributing to drought management in the Komati catchment (see Table 2 for 
definition of acronyms) 





completed Purpose of the dam
Nooitgedacht 78.2 1962 Water for thermal power stations and bulk domestic water supply outside the basin
Vygeboom 83.3 1971 Water for thermal power stations
Maguga 332.0 2002 Water for irrigated agriculture, hydropower generation and domestic use
Driekoppies 251.0 1998 Water for irrigated agriculture and domestic use
Sand River 49.0 1965 Water for irrigation outside the basin
Source: (DWAF, 2009)
Table 2. Institutions involved in water resource management in the 
lower Komati catchment, including the management of Maguga and 
Driekoppies Dams
Institutions Country
Tripartite Permanent Technical Committee 
(TPTC)
Eswatini, South Africa, 
Mozambique
Incomati System Operating Task Group 
(ISOTG)
Eswatini, South Africa, 
Mozambique
Joint Water Commission (JWC) Eswatini, South Africa
Komati Joint Operations Forum (KJOF) Eswatini, South Africa
Department of Water Affairs (DWA) Eswatini
Department of Water and Sanitation (DWS) South Africa
Inkomati-Usuthu Catchment Management 
Agency (IUCMA)
South Africa
Komati River Basin Authority (KRBA) Eswatini
Komati-Lomati Irrigation Boards (IB) South Africa
Mhlume Water Eswatini
Emandla Ekuphila Water User District 
(EEWUD)
Eswatini
Disaster Management Agencies (DMA) Eswatini, South Africa
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facilitate the implementation of drought measures which are 
designed by the different sectors, such as agriculture and the 
water sector. The weather services in both countries provide 
weather and climate-related information.
METHODS
A qualitative research method was adopted to explore and 
evaluate the drought management practices of various 
actors in the Komati catchment. Data collection was done 
using in-depth semi-structured interviews with 30 actors 
in the study area, including water institutions, national 
representatives from the water departments in both Eswatini 
and South Africa, national disaster management agencies 
in both countries, weather services as well as smallholder 
and commercial farmers in both countries (Table 3). The 
field data were collected between November 2017 and 
January 2018. The purpose of the interviews was to get 
insight into how scientific knowledge, decision support tools 
and policies shaped responses to the 2015/2016 drought 
event for different actors and how the lessons learnt can 
be used to further future drought management. We used a 
topic list in which we examined the role of issues such as 
drought forecasting, monitoring, measures and practices, 
institutional and technical arrangements as well as post-
drought assessment. Drought forecasting and monitoring 
acts as a guide to drought management planning and 
informs the responses by different actors and vice versa. 
These responses are facilitated or implemented as measures 
and practices under a particular institutional and technical 
arrangement. In turn, the measures and practices can shape 
or inform changes to existing institutional and technical 
arrangement. Post-event/drought assessment (evaluation) 
of the drought responses brings about experiential learning 
which could be embedded in future planning to improve 
drought management. 
To complement information gathered from the interviews, 
we analysed data from secondary sources, including technical 
reports, online newspaper articles and official statements 
released during the drought, to cross-check the statements 
from the interview respondents. We also analysed in detail 
the minutes of the KJOF meetings held between October 
2014 and December 2016. Moreover, we conducted a time-
series analysis of meteorological and hydrological data to 
characterize historical drought events and compared these 
with the 2015/2016 drought in terms of severity. The data 
from one precipitation station (Mhlume) and one gauging 
station (Hooggenoeg) were used to compute the Standardized 
Precipitation Index (SPI) and Standardized Runoff Index 
(SRI), respectively, using the SPI program. McKee et al. (1993) 
suggested a drought classification based on SPI values: mild 
drought (SPI: 0.0 to −0.99), moderate drought (SPI: −1.0 to 
−1.49), severe drought (SPI: −1.5 to −1.99), and extreme drought 
(SPI: less or equal to −2.0). These drought indicators were 
expressed in time scales of 3, 6 and 12 months.
RESULTS
Drought management practices: responses to the 
2015/2016 drought 
There were a number of different drought mitigation and 
adaptation measures that were implemented during the 
2015/2016 drought in the Komati catchment. These measures 
were implemented at national, provincial and local levels. The 
planning of the measures was done by the different actors 
in coordination with the countries’ disaster management 
agencies. Since there is no specific drought policy or drought 
preparedness plan for the KOBWA water management area, the 
countries’ sectorial plans were implemented at the local level. 
Nevertheless, rationing of water supplies during drought is a 
policy action stipulated in the ISOTG rules, which needs to 
be tailored to a certain drought situation.  KOBWA, together 
with other transboundary institutions, was responsible for 
developing drought measures for Maguga and Driekoppies 
Dams to make sure water users (irrigation and domestic) in 
Eswatini and South Africa were served. The main drought 
mitigation measures implemented in the 2015/2016 drought, 
as well as other important drought response mechanisms, are 
summarised in the timeline presented in Fig. 3. In this section 
we first present the responses by institutions and thereafter by 
water users.
Response by institutions
Water rationing was the main drought adaptation measure 
that was implemented by the water management institutions 
in the 2015/2016 drought. Water rationing was implemented 
by KOBWA at allocation level, meaning that water users, on 
paper, were allocated less water than the treaty allocations, 
and other water user institutions such as the irrigation boards 
and water user districts, at distribution level, meaning that 
Table 3. Overview of the interviewed institutions and actors in the study (see Table 2 for definition of acronyms)
Government officials Water institutions Main water users Total
Institution No. of 
interviewees
Institution No. of  
interviewees
Institution No. of 
interviewees





2 Mhlume Water 1 Commercial 
farming
2
JWC/TPTC 2 iUCMA 1 Municipalities 2
EEWUD 1
irrigation boards 1
Komati River Basin Authority 1
DMA 2
Total 7 11 12 30
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the institutions, on paper, were distributing less water than 
normally. In Fig. 3, only the water rationing implemented 
by KOBWA is indicated on the timeline. The use of the 
rationing model by KOBWA is a common practice and users 
are familiar with it: it is used twice a year under ‘normal’ 
conditions, which is in the beginning of the water year 
(which is April for KOBWA) and at the beginning of the 
rainy season (around November). However, during drought 
conditions the rationing model is used more frequently to 
determine when water use restrictions should be imposed, 
increased or reduced. In the water year 2015/2016, KOBWA 
imposed the first water use restriction in October 2015 
(KJOF minutes dated 22 October 2015). The water use was 
restricted by 20% until the end of the water year (March 
2016). It is worth noting that the water institutions which are 
decentralized from government, such as the Inkomati-Usuthu 
Catchment Management Agency (IUCMA) and KOBWA, were 
emphasizing the need to tighten the water use restrictions 
based on the rationing model results, to avoid stricter 
restrictions in the future. However, water user institutions, 
such as irrigation boards and Mhlume Water, as well as 
the Department of Water Affairs of Eswatini, were more 
concerned about the commercial farmers who had already 
planted their crops, because cutting irrigation would affect 
crop yields and thus their socio-economic situation. That is 
why water use restrictions were not tightened by KOBWA 
even though the dam levels were declining. Moreover, during 
the KJOF meeting of 28 January 2016, KOBWA kept on 
recommending to the forum that the water use restriction 
be increased beyond 20% due to the persisting drought 
conditions. However, the forum decided to maintain the 20% 
curtailment. This indicates a strong negotiation position 
of water users in KJOF. Water use rationing was increased 
to 40% only at the start of the 2016/2017 water year, i.e., in 
April 2016, which is also the start of the dry season. Storage 
levels were at 30% of full capacity for Maguga Dam and 44% 
for Driekoppies Dam (Fig. 4) at that time. Restrictions were 
further increased to 80 % in October 2016, which is normally 
the start of the rainy season. At that time storage levels of 
Maguga and Driekoppies Dams had dropped to 17% and 25%, 
respectively. Fortunately, the 2015/2016 drought did not turn 
out to be as long as the drought in the 1990s, as some good 
rains fell after October 2016, which resulted in increased 
river flows and thus rising storage levels in both Maguga and 
Driekoppies Dams. Consequently, water use rationing levels 
were reduced by KOBWA in January and April 2017.  
Use of early warning and communication 
The South African Weather Service (SAWS) and Eswatini 
Meteorological Services provide climate and weather 
information to guide water users and other actors. The Eswatini 
Meteorological Service and other actors in Eswatini rely on 
the information from the SAWS due to a lack of good climate 
forecasting technology in Eswatini. Therefore, the results 
presented in this study mainly focus on the operation of the 
SAWS. The SAWS use a multi-model system and climate drivers 
such as El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO), Indian Ocean 
Dipole (IOD) and Southern Annular Mode (SAM) for climate 
forecasting (SAWS, 2019).  These global climatic indices are 
widely used in forecasting, following the basic assumption that 
they influence the global climate (Cai et al., 2011).
SAWS communicate weather and climate forecasts to 
public and private institutions (e.g. water and sanitation 
sector, agriculture, environment, etc.) through monthly 
weather advisories. The advisories are released to the 
stakeholders through the media (e.g. newspapers, television), 
workshops, meetings and online publications. The advisories 
indicated that the preceding hydrological year (2014/2015) 
was characterized by high temperatures and below-normal 
Figure 3. Timeline of some important responses to the 2015/2016 drought event in the Komati catchment
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rainfall. This was corroborated by rainfall data of Mhlume 
within the Komati catchment as noted in the following section 
on drought characterization and monitoring. However, the 
set of dynamic and statistical model predictions indicated 
a neutral ENSO condition throughout 2014 until early 
2015, when the development of a weak El Niño was noticed. 
The strengthening of El Niño was noted in August 2015. 
Consequently, the high probability of extreme dry conditions 
was then predicted. Yet this happened relatively late. At this 
point, an official warning about the drought was released by 
the weather services. Consistent with these predictions, an 
extreme meteorological drought was observed during the 
rainy season 2015/2016, as noted by the SPI analysis; whereas 
the hydrological drought was only moderate (starting from 
May 2015), as noted in the following section on drought 
characterization and monitoring. Similarly, the inflows to 
Maguga and Driekoppies Dams had a declining trend as 
noted during the KJOF meetings held from March to August 
2015. The minutes of these KJOF meetings make no mention 
of meteorological drought forecasts having been discussed. 
Even though during the 20 August 2015 meeting KOBWA 
had shown that its rationing model indicated that there 
was a need for water restrictions, the decision to implement 
was postponed because forum members did not come to 
an agreement about the water rationing. Also during that 
meeting it was decided to cancel the September meeting, as 
there was not much need for the Forum to meet.
Enhanced monitoring and other actions
In addition to rationing, the water management institutions in 
the catchment strengthened monitoring of the water resources. 
For example, the irrigation boards in South Africa strictly 
monitored their own members by actively using the telemetric 
system to monitor water abstraction as well as doing frequent 
site visits to check on compliance. Also, KOBWA intensified 
monitoring, particularly of groundwater levels throughout 
the catchment to evaluate groundwater–surface water 
interactions. These responses were coupled with awareness 
campaigns initiated by KOBWA, the municipalities as well 
as the weather services within the catchment; the campaigns 
targeted domestic water users, farmers and the wider public 
about the drought, its anticipated impacts and possible coping 
mechanisms. For example, KOBWA conducted awareness 
campaigns in about 10 communities in its area of operation, 
both in Eswatini and South Africa. The aim of the campaigns 
was to teach the public about water-saving technologies during 
the drought as a means to adapt to the drought situation 
(KOBWA, 2019). 
As the water resources were depleting with the persisting 
drought and continuing water use by commercial farmers, the 
departments responsible for water in both countries started 
exploring alternative sources of water, such as groundwater. 
Both governments rehabilitated and drilled new boreholes 
for domestic water supply in municipalities in the catchment 
as well as supplied potable water with tankers through the 
disaster management agencies to communities that were most 
affected. In South Africa, new groundwater permits were issued 
for individuals who wanted to drill boreholes for irrigation 
purposes. However, some boreholes dried up due to declining 
groundwater levels. Since this was an emergency measure, the 
permits were issued without detailed groundwater mapping 
to determine the yields of aquifers. This highlights that 
scientific tools and processes were not adequately used during 
this drought emergency period, because there was not time 
available to apply them. 
Response by water users
Different actors adapted to the drought differently, depending 
on their vulnerability and coping capacity. The commercial 
farming sectors, particularly sugarcane companies, like the 
Royal Swaziland Sugar Corporation (RSSC) in Eswatini, 
were better placed to deal with the drought than smallholder 
farmers. The commercial farmers, mainly sugarcane 
companies and citrus growers, adapted to both the drought 
and water rationing by KOBWA through adjusting their 
irrigation cycles, particularly by reducing the irrigation 
frequency, accepting the prospect of secure but lower yields. 
In the case of RSSC, the use of a decision support tool was 
key to making decisions on reducing the irrigation frequency. 
This model determined the critical water requirement at 
Figure 4. The volume of water stored in Maguga and Driekoppies dams, April 2002 – September 2017 (source: KOBWA, 2017)
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specific sugarcane growth stages and water was supplied 
just to keep the crop alive, to avoid having to replant the 
fields in the next season after the drought. Individual 
commercial farmers, especially in South Africa, owned small 
reservoirs to collect and store local runoff in addition to 
the water allocations from Maguga and Driekoppies Dams. 
Some were also drilling boreholes to supplement irrigation 
water. Smallholder farmers from both Eswatini and South 
Africa were prioritising the irrigated sugarcane fields by 
age and productivity; old and less productive fields were 
either irrigated less or abandoned altogether. Furthermore, 
smallholder farmers shifted the irrigation times from day to 
night when temperatures were lower to reduce evaporative 
losses. Other irrigated crops, such as maize, were not affected 
much but rainfed crops failed completely.
On the other hand, urban water supply on the Eswatini 
side, for Pigg’s Peak town, was not affected as domestic 
water was given first priority. However, rural communities 
in Eswatini were very much affected by the drought because 
they depend for their household and agricultural supply 
on water drawn directly from the Komati River. As river 
levels were dropping significantly, they began competing 
with irrigating farmers for water. Even though on paper 
domestic water was to be given priority during the drought, 
as stipulated by the ISOTG rules, the Nkomanzi Municipality 
in South Africa was affected by the low river levels as its 
pumps for drawing water were directly installed in the river. 
This resulted in less water being treated thus less domestic 
water was supplied to the municipality. The municipality 
held awareness campaigns among the urban and rural 
communities together with KOBWA to promote water-saving 
technologies, and also drilled boreholes to enhance water 
supply for these households.
Impact and challenges of the 2015/2016 drought
For farmers, the major impact of the drought was on crop 
production; crop yields of both sugarcane in the commercial 
sector and cereals in the smallholder sector were affected. 
Compared to the long-term average (1970–2017), sugarcane 
yields were about 13% lower in the 2016/2017 season, the lowest 
on record since 1970 (Fig. 5). Although the drought affected 
sugarcane yields, it did not have a negative effect on the sucrose 
content (Fig. 5). 
The commercial farmers and the water user institutions 
(e.g. irrigation boards and water user districts) were not willing 
to adhere to water use rationing during the drought and this 
led to delays in the implementation of water use restrictions 
and was the major factor influencing tight water restrictions in 
the later stages of the drought. The strict water use restrictions 
of 60% were responded to by illegal water abstraction by 
commercial farmers beyond their allocations. Regardless of the 
implementation of water rationing and intensified monitoring, 
water users continued to abstract water. One of the interviewed 
commercial farmers boldly mentioned that ‘we broke the water 
meters purposely to over-abstract without evidence.’ Moreover, 
where there was evidence of ‘over-abstraction’, farmers were 
willing to pay the fine as, according to them, the benefit 
they got from the water was worth much more than the fine. 
This indicates that the fines charged were too low (e.g. about 
0.004 USD/m3) to provide an incentive for farmers to use less. 
The water abstractions by commercial farmers reduced 
the transboundary flow to Mozambique. The minimum 
transboundary flow to Mozambique, according to the Pigg’s 
Peak Agreement signed in 1991 by the three riparian countries, 
is supposed to be 2 m3/s on average over 3 days, with 55% (1.1 
m3/s) coming from the Komati River and 45% (0.9 m3/s) from 
the Crocodile River (Van der Zaag and Vaz, 2003). Shortfalls 
of the agreed minimum transboundary flow to Mozambique 
started in October 2015 (KJOF minutes dated 19 November 
2015). During the 2015/2016 water year, the agreement was 
violated by actors in South Africa about 30% of the time with a 
total shortfall of 9.8 Mm3/year as reported in the annual report 
of KOBWA (2016). Things got even worse in the 2016/2017 
water year, when KOBWA reported that the minimum flow to 
Mozambique was violated during 188 days (52% of time), with a 
shortfall of 12.1 Mm3 (KOBWA, 2017).
To some extent, one of the challenges faced by governments 
was lack of finances and technological capacity to carry out 
planned drought mitigation and adaptation measures. For 
example, a groundwater inventory in Eswatini was planned 
to be undertaken before the 2015/2016 water year. However, 
the exercise was not carried out because of insufficient 
financial resources and scientific tools. This means that it was 
Figure 5. Historical average annual sugarcane yields in the lower Komati in Eswatini, and average sucrose content recorded by Mhlume sugar 
mills from sugarcane growers in the lower Komati catchment in Eswatini (adapted from Eswatini Sugar Association, 2017)
https://doi.org/10.17159/wsa/2019.v45.i4.7535
Available at https://www.watersa.net
ISSN 1816-7950 (Online) = Water SA Vol. 45 No. 4 October 2019
Published under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Licence (CC BY 4.0) 553
not precisely known how much additional groundwater was 
available to supplement the dwindling surface water sources.
Lessons learnt by different actors
The severity and intensity of the 2015/2016 drought and 
experiences with its mitigation provide important lessons 
to different actors including the governments, farmers, and 
scientists, as well as decision and policy makers. The lessons 
learnt by scientists (e.g. water planners and managers) and 
decision makers ranged from the need to improve drought 
preparedness to implementation of drought adaptation measures 
as well as scientific tools used in drought management. The 
institutions in the catchment acknowledge that planning 
for drought is important to increase preparedness for future 
events. This includes developing drought preparedness plans 
by institutions from national to local level to ensure readiness 
up to the community level (water users). Moreover, a need for a 
coordinating drought task team was recognised by the several 
interviewed actors such as water planners, meteorologists and 
agriculturists, whereby representatives from different sectors 
such as agriculture, water and weather services can work 
together for the development of informed decisions in drought 
management. Whereas the DMAs might be doing that at 
national level, it has been suggested to introduce the drought task 
force at basin or catchment level.
Moreover, there is consensus on the need for water 
institutions in both South Africa and Eswatini to improve the 
technical expertise of farmers in water management and water 
use efficiency, e.g., through organising training events. Most 
farmers indicated that the government should provide financial 
assistance to support farmers to recover from the drought. In 
addition, some farmers realised the need to get insured against 
droughts to ensure security of their investments. Most actors 
within the catchment indicated the need for construction of 
more reservoirs to improve water supply. Since the frequency 
of extreme climate events (floods and droughts) is expected 
to increase in the future, most people are of the opinion that 
collecting and storing more water during flood events could be 
helpful during droughts. 
The scientific tools used for drought forecasting by SAWS 
produce good results for climate forecasts and drought 
monitoring. However, SAWS learnt that the public or end-
users of the weather (especially farmers) and climate forecast 
information have difficulty in correctly interpreting and using 
the information. For example, if the forecast indicates a 30% 
probability of rainfall, many farmers quickly conclude that 
they will receive rainfall. This has created a wrong perception 
among some users of climate forecasts.  
Farmers using the sprinkler irrigation systems realised that 
this is not the best technology available and does not conserve 
water, therefore, is not drought-proof. More water-efficient systems 
were highly recommended by the farmers such as drip irrigation 
that can conserve more water and increase water productivity. 
However, the limitation is the financial resources associated with 
installing and maintaining a drip irrigation system. Alternatively, 
smallholder farmers suggested switching to annual crops (e.g. 
cereals and vegetables) rather than perennial crops such as 
Figure 6. Time series of (a) meteorological drought indicator SPI-3 at Mhlume; and (b) hydrological drought indicator SRI-3 at Hooggenoeg
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sugarcane and fruit trees, which currently occupy more than 90% 
of the irrigated land in the catchment, but indicated this to be 
limited by market constraints.
Drought characterization and monitoring
Figure 6 presents the Standardized Precipitation Index (SPI) 
which we used to characterise meteorological drought, and 
the Standardized Runoff Index (SRI) used to characterize 
hydrological drought. Mishra and Singh (2010) define 
meteorological drought as the lack of precipitation in an area 
over a period of time and hydrological drought as the period 
where there is lack of surface water resources to adequately 
meet the water use in a water management system. Generally, 
both drought indicators capture the historic drought events, 
including 1982/1983, 1991/1995, 2003/2004 as well as the recent 
drought of 2015/2016. The dotted lines indicate the start of 
a severe drought (−1.5, red) and an extreme drought event 
(−2, black), following the drought classification by McKee et 
al. (1993). Figure 6 indicates that the 2015/2016 meteorological 
drought was the most severe since the 1980s. However, the 
drought of the early 1990s was longer than the 2015/2016 
drought event. Consecutive droughts formed by mild and 
moderate droughts can be very devastating due to their total 
duration (Trambauer et al., 2014). 
Figure 6 also shows that the meteorological droughts 
propagated into hydrological droughts, meaning that the lack 
of precipitation eventually resulted in declining surface and 
subsurface water resources. The SPI-3 values for March–June 
2015 were in the range of −1.28 to −1.86, indicating the onset 
of a severe to moderate meteorological drought. Most notably, 
the SPI-3 for the rainy season of 2015–2016 clearly depicted 
extreme drought as noted by the SPI values of below −1.5 for 
the period December 2015 to February 2016 (SPI: −2.42 in 
December and −1.86 in February). On the other hand, the 
SRI-3 dropped below −1.0 in May 2015, indicating the onset of 
a moderate hydrological drought. Later on, the SRI-3 estimates 
ranged between −1.0 and −1.3 from May 2015 until October 
2016, indicating persistence of a moderate hydrological drought 
at Hooggenoeg hydrological station for about 17 months (see 
Appendix for results of SPI and SRI 6 and 12). These results 
show that even though an extreme meteorological drought is 
indicated at Mhlume in 2015/2016, this did not translate into 
an extreme hydrological drought but only a moderate drought 
at Hooggenoeg. This could be because of the difference in 
geographical location of the two stations as well as that the 
discharge is highly regulated due to the reservoirs upstream of 
the gauging station. Moreover, the hydrological drought was 
more persistent compared to the meteorological drought. 
DISCUSSION
Effectiveness of early warning system in drought 
management
In theory, an effective early warning system is reliable, and 
communicated in understandable language to relevant 
stakeholders on time, to enable the stakeholders to plan for 
droughts and increase preparedness (De León et al., 2006; 
Kelman and Glantz, 2014; Wilhite, 2011). This can give end 
users of the information an opportunity to design systemic 
drought response measures in advance and reduce the risk 
of drought impacts. Results from this case study indicate 
that, despite the availability of good scientific knowledge 
and tools for climate forecasts, drought impacts were more 
severe compared to other previous droughts, mainly because 
competition for water resources has grown in the catchment. 
This observation agrees with Baudoin et al. (2017), who 
highlighted that there have been improvements in the 
drought forecasting capacity in South Africa but without 
a concomitant reduction of the impacts of droughts. This 
could be attributed to the insufficient use of the early warning 
information for planning by the actors (especially KJOF and 
farmers). For instance, the results of the rationing models 
were not sufficiently utilized to undertake timely decisions on 
water use curtailments by KJOF, which indicates a risk-taking 
attitude despite sound information on drought prevalence. 
Moreover, for some of the farmers who did use the information 
for planning purposes the information was communicated 
late. The insufficient use of available information and late 
communications may have contributed to unwanted reactive 
measures such as illegal abstractions and non-sustainable 
groundwater abstractions. Another noteworthy point is 
related to the reliability of the forecasts. The survey results 
indicated that many farmers do not have sufficient faith in 
the reliability of weather forecasts and do not use it when 
planning the irrigation season. This lack of trust may have 
developed because in the past when the weather services got 
the predictions wrong on several occasions, which could 
still happen due to uncertainties in the complexity of the 
climate system and limitations of the modelling procedures, 
despite remarkable scientific advances in the field of climate 
forecasting. For example, in 1997 the weather forecast in South 
Africa predicted a severe El Niño induced drought; however, 
the drought was not as severe as predicted. Farmers responded 
to the warnings by reducing purchase of agricultural inputs 
by 20%. Such false alarms inform stakeholders’ willingness to 
adopt drought-coping strategies or not (Wilhite et al., 2005). As 
expressed by Siderius et al. (2018), the accuracy and timeliness 
of the seasonal climate forecasts is still a main challenge for 
forecasters and those communicating the information to the 
different stakeholders and users. 
Even though some farmers’ perceptions of weather forecasts 
are negative, institutions such as KOBWA perceive the early 
warning information to be useful in planning. Use of this 
information for planning purposes is contested, particularly 
by those who do not trust the accuracy of the forecasts. This 
has contributed to delays in the implementation of mitigation 
measures such as water rationing, as was the case for the 
Lower Komati. This suggests that building confidence in the 
reliability of the climate forecasts is as important as the use of 
the scientific tools and technology. To build that confidence 
among planners and farmers, when communicated to end-
users, climate forecasts needs to be fully translated to usable 
information that can be understood easily and used for 
planning, and should include information on the uncertainty 
range of the forecasts. Moreover, whereas the KJOF is the 
main forum where decisions on the use of water stored in 
Maguga and Driekoppies Dams and consequent releases are 
taken, the meteorological services were not involved  in this 
forum and the meteorological drought forecasts were not 
explicitly deliberated in the meetings held during the 2015/2016 
drought. Apart from the drought forecasts, real-time analysis 
of hydro-meteorological records (e.g. through SPI, SRI and 
other drought indicators) within the Komati catchment can 
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Factors influencing effective drought management and 
experiential learning
Many researchers call for decentralized water management 
institutions to improve the participation at local level (Agrawal, 
2008; Vogel et al., 2010; Wilhite et al., 2014). In the Komati 
catchment, particularly the KOBWA management area, a 
participatory approach was noted to be practised. For example, 
KJOF consists of the representatives at national level (e.g. 
Eswatini Department of Water Affairs, DWA) as well as local 
level (water users such as irrigation boards). This forum usually 
holds monthly meetings to discuss issues of water management 
for the Maguga and Driekoppies Dams. Moreover, the use of 
scientific tools (e.g. hydrological models) by KOBWA to inform 
decision making for the two dams, such as water allocation 
and water rationing, was seen to be useful, especially during 
drought conditions. For example, although water rationing 
decisions were very difficult to make, the information generated 
by modelling tools was still instrumental in the discussions 
of KJOF and in the ultimate decisions taken on timing and 
amount of water use curtailments.
However, it was noted that most of the drought 
management strategies were implemented when the drought 
had already started and impacts had been felt. The response 
to the drought was thus reactive rather than proactive. 
Despite the well-structured institutional arrangements in the 
catchment, drought management strategies implemented in 
the 2015/2016 drought did not reduce the vulnerability of water 
users (especially farmers in the Lower Komati and further 
downstream users in Mozambique) to drought. Suggested 
measures such as construction of more reservoirs may not be 
a real solution as the water resources in the basin are already 
heavily utilised, with quite a high storage to runoff ratio (total 
storage of the existing significant reservoirs in the Komati 
catchment is 793 Mm3 while annual runoff is about 1 430 Mm3/
year, giving a storage to runoff ratio of 0.55). The absence of a 
drought policy in the catchment as well as the lack of drought 
preparedness plans hinders the reduction of vulnerability 
of the water users. Moreover, the lower Komati catchment is 
highly dominated by perennial crops such as fruit trees and 
sugarcane, the latter being a high-water-demand crop, with 
an irrigated area that is still increasing. The dominance of 
perennial crops in the Komati catchment strongly reduces 
the ability to adaptively respond to a predicted drought. So, 
reducing the irrigated area or changing to seasonal and/or less 
water-demanding crops could reduce the vulnerability of the 
farmers. Promoting self-reliance among water users, especially 
farmers, can increase the coping capacity within society and 
thus reduce the risk of high impacts of future drought events 
(Iglesias et al., 2009); for example, through using water-efficient 
irrigation systems such as drip irrigation as well as making 
use of drought-resistant crop varieties and diversifying food 
sources (O’Farrell et al., 2009). The recommendations related 
to more efficient water use (e.g. adoption of drip irrigation) 
could contribute to reducing the drought impact to some extent 
if coupled with adequate institutional arrangements to limit 
the expansion of irrigation area. This research indicates the 
need for a cautious approach to avoid falling into the so-called 
‘efficiency paradox’, because the higher efficiency rarely reduces 
water consumption (Grafton et al. 2018). For example, the 
farmers may decide to expand irrigated area to utilize the water 
saved through adoption of water-efficient technologies, which 
in turn may induce even more water consumption (e.g. Ahmad 
et al., 2014; Grafton et al. 2018).
Furthermore, it is often argued that effective management 
of drought risk might require additional technological, 
financial and human resources (Vogel et al., 2010; Baudoin et 
al., 2017). KOBWA is a relatively well-resourced institution 
in terms of scientific tools but use of the results from these 
technologies is not as effective as it could be, which was shown 
by the fact that water rationing was implemented late even 
though models had indicated otherwise. This suggests that 
not only are resources important in drought management 
but buy-in of the actors as well as political will are needed to 
efficiently implement drought measures. Post-assessment of 
the drought responses after every drought episode can greatly 
improve drought management through ‘adaptive learning’ (De 
Stefano et al., 2015).  
CONCLUSIONS
This case study shows that scientific tools and coordinated 
monitoring and evaluation of drought management, in spite 
of their widely acclaimed potential for use in water resources 
planning and management, only partially inform decisions of 
water actors to start restricting water use. Despite the presence 
of scientific tools (e.g. models for climate forecast from SAWS 
and hydrological models within KOBWA) and institutional 
arrangements that allow stakeholder participation, drought 
management in the 2015/2016 drought was mainly based 
on reactive measures. The measures implemented partially 
helped in minimizing the damage for the water users but did 
not tackle the root cause of vulnerability of the water users, 
especially farmers. The use of scientific tools and knowledge 
during drought events was not fully translated to effective 
implementation of the decision support systems, as actors 
delayed acting on predictions or implementing drought 
measures. Therefore, developing drought preparedness plans 
by the water institutions can improve the coordination of the 
drought management practices, i.e., knowing what to do before, 
during and after a drought event. Moreover, timely decision-
making during drought events can be supported by improved 
reliability and understanding of the model predictions (e.g. 
climate forecast and water resources availability and demands). 
Additionally, timely enactment of drought declaration 
protocols, and enhanced institutional collaboration, as well 
as adopting well-phased strategies to mitigate impacts (e.g. 
changes in cropping pattern and intensities), could support 
drought management in heavily committed catchments such as 
the Komati. 
Although there seemed to be a great number of lessons 
learnt in 2015/2016 by the actors in the Komati catchment, 
the lessons remain fragmented or localised at sectorial or 
even individual level. Therefore, coordinated monitoring 
and evaluation of these lessons and experiences between the 
different sectors is needed to successfully use them in future 
drought events. In this context, the relevance of a drought 
task team has been suggested, whereby representatives from 
different sectors, including agriculture, water and weather 
services, coordinate activities at basin or catchment level 
during impending droughts. This case study thus demonstrates 
that learning from past drought management experiences could 
be very useful to further improve scientific tools, policies and 
practices for drought management.  
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APPENDIX
Role of the institutions in the KOBWA management area
Since the Komati catchment is transboundary, there are a 
number of agreements that govern water development and 
management in the catchment as well as the Incomati basin as a 
whole. The Tripartite Permanent Technical Committee (TPTC) 
provides advice on all technical matters regarding the sharing 
of rivers of common interest. This committee is composed of 
three representatives from each of the riparian countries. The 
committees’ functions include, among others, to recommend 
any measures to be undertaken to reduce short-term problems 
regarding water shortages in rivers of common interest 
during drought periods. The establishment of the committee 
was followed by the Pigg’s Peak Agreement of 1991 on the 
development of the Komati River Basin Project between South 
Africa and Eswatini. Mozambique is part of the agreement 
because one of the interim measures which came about as a 
result of the agreement was that the Komati and Crocodile 
catchments should maintain a cross-border release of 2 m3/s 
averaged over a cycle of 3 days to meet the water needs in the 
reach from Ressano Garcia in Mozambique.
In the Komati catchment, two bilateral treaties were signed 
between Eswatini and South Africa in 1992. One treaty is on the 
establishment and functioning of the Joint Water Commission 
and the other treaty on the Development and Utilization of 
Water Resources of the Komati River Basin. The latter treaty 
led to the establishment of KOBWA which was mandated to 
implement Phase 1 of the Komati River Basin Development 
Project. Phase 1 comprised the construction of the Driekoppies 
and Maguga Dams which were completed in 1998 and 2002, 
respectively. 
Institutionally, water management in South Africa 
and Eswatini is carried out at various levels, from policy 
to management and operational levels. In Eswatini, water 
management is executed by the National Water Authority, the 
River Basin Authorities and lower level institutions. The Komati 
River Basin Authority is tasked with the role of managing the 
released water for users in the Komati catchment. However, the 
authority is still in its infancy stage; hence, most of its activities 
are currently done by the Eswatini Department of Water Affairs 
(DWA). Lower level institutions for operations on the ground 
include Emandla Ekuphila Water User District (EEWUD) 
for small-scale farmers and Mhlume Water (commercial and 
smallholder water users), which undertake water management 
for water users under their jurisdiction. These two institutions 
handle most of the water management issues on behalf of the 
users in the lower part of the Komati catchment in Eswatini. 
On the South African side, the Inkomati-Usuthu Catchment 
Management Agency (IUCMA) handles water management 
issues on behalf of the water users, working with specialised 
water institutions like the irrigation boards. The IUCMA 
performs water resource management at the local level 
involving protection, use, development, conservation and 
control of water resources within the Inkomati-Usuthu Water 
Management Area. The Komati and Lomati Irrigation Boards 
are the main irrigation boards in the Komati catchment in 
South Africa, representing the irrigators.
At transboundary level, the Joint Water Commission 
(JWC) serves as a technical adviser to the countries on matters 
relating to the development and utilization of the shared 
water resources. It is responsible for the overall governance 
of the Komati Basin; however, if the matter at hand affects 
Mozambique, then the TPTC deals with the matter. Both the 
JWC and TPTC are responsible for advising on policy-related 
matters. KOBWA works with the Komati Joint Operations 
Forum (KJOF). The KJOF is formed by members of the 
Komati River Basin Authority, IUCMA, government officials 
from the DWA/DWS (South African Department of Water 
and Sanitation) as well as representatives of the water users 
in both countries. The forum advises KOBWA on the daily 
operational matters of the Komati River Basin. The Inkomati 
System Operating Task Group (ISOTG) was formed in 1998 
by the TPTC to assist with the development of operating rules 
for the entire Incomati basin. The responsibility of the ISOTG 
with regards to the Komati River Basin is to make proposals 
and advise the TPTC on technical matters. The ISOTG is also 
responsible for the development of operating rules for Maguga 
and Driekoppies Dams as well as the system of weirs in the 
Komati and Lomati rivers. 
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Figure A2. Time series of (a) meteorological drought indicator SPI-12 at Mhlume, and (b) hydrological drought indicator SRI-12 at Hooggenoeg
SPI and SRI results
Figure A1. Time series of (a) meteorological drought indicator SPI-6 at Mhlume, and (b) hydrological drought indicator SRI-6 at Hooggenoeg
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